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ABBREVIATIONS 
For the purpose of this Brief, when referring to the transcript , 
the abbreviation , !Tr. " followed by page and line will be used. When 
referring to the record brought up from the Third District Court, the 
abbreviation MRn followed by the page number will be used. All other 
documents will be referred to by full name. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Brief will deal solely with answering the Cross-Appeal of 
the Defendant-Respondent Mid-Valley Investment taken from the denial 
of their counterclaims for bond forfeiture and unlawful detainer by 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. of the Third District Court, after t r ial 
of the same. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
After a t r ia l on the counterclaims of Defendants-Respondents 
for unlawful detainer and bond forfeiture, the Third District Court, 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. presiding, dismissed the counterclaims. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
To have the decision of the t r ia l court affirmed, with respect 
to Defendants-Respondents' counterclaims. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This statement will be limited to those facts concerning the 
limited issues involved in the Cross-Appeal of the Defendant-JRespondent 
Mid-Valley Investment. The t r ia l of the Defendants-Respondents1 
counterclaims came on for hearing on the 10th day of April, 1975, before 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. in the Third District Court. (See R. page 
109.) The original counterclaim alleged unlawful detainer on both of 
the properties in dispute, i . e . , the residence on 12th Avenue, and the 
apartment house on 11th East (see R. pages 21-23), and for forfeiture 
of plaintiffs1 bond in the amount of $10. 00 for each day from February 
10, 1975 to the date of entry of judgment, together with attorney's fees. 
(R. page 23) However, the t r ial court denied the counterclaims. (See 
R. page 145, Conclusions of Law and Judgment; R. page 113) The 
counterclaims arose as a result of Plaintiffs-Appellants1 action to set 
aside an alleged t rus tee ' s sale of their property purportedly held on 
January 16, 1975. (See Complaint R. pages 1-4.) The issue of setting 
aside the alleged sale was determined by the t r ia l court upon a Motion 
for Summary Judgment by the Defendant-Respondent Mid-Valley Invest-
ment. (See R. page 28.) The hearing on the same was heard on March 
27, 1975; however, the decision of the court was not had until the 10th 
of April, 1975. (R. page 108.) 
Between the alleged sale of the property, January 16, 1975, and 
- 2 -
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the decis ion of the Dis t r ic t Court affirming the same on Apr i l 10, 1975, 
the following events took p lace .
 c >• . ; 
A) Plaintiffs-Appellants signed an agreement to remove t h e m -
selves from the p roper ty on 11th Eas t by January 31, 1975. (Exhibit 
1-d.) 
B) On F e b r u a r y 1st, Mid-Valley changed locks on doors and 
would only allow ent ry by Plaint iffs-Appellants under the i r supervis ion. 
(Tr . page 179, l ines 20-21 ; T r . page 199, l ines 2-12.) 
C) Mid-Valley allowed an extension of the t ime for Plaint iffs-
Appellants to remove the i r p roper ty from the p r e m i s e s , f irst until 
F e b r u a r y 7, and then until F e b r u a r y 10. (Tr . page 183, l ines 7-16; 
T r . page 180, l ines 1-10.) 
D) Plaint iffs-Appellants then obtained a r e s t r a in ing o rde r , 
with Mid-Valley1 s approval , to allow them to use the office in the p r e -
m i s e s and prevent Mid-Valley from removing the furni ture . (R. page 
11; T r . page 180, l ines 10-14.) 
E) Plaint iffs-Appellants had physical possess ion of the 
p r e m i s e s at no t ime after J anua ry 31, 1975. (Tr . page 196, l ines 22-27.) 
F) A hear ing on the res t ra in ing o rde r was had on F e b r u a r y 18, 
1975 in the Dis t r ic t Cour t , at which t ime the res t ra in ing o rde r was 
affirmed provided Plaint iffs-Appellants posted a $7 ,500 .00 bond. (JR. 
pages 13-14.) 
- 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
G) Plaintiffs-Appellants obtained the bond, but elected to 
remove their furniture on March 5, 1975. (Tr. page 180, lines 22-28.) 
ARGUMENT ON DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS1 CROSS-APPEAL 
FROM DENIAL OF ITS COUNTERCLAIMS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WERE NOT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
OF THE 11th EAST PROPERTY. 
The unlawful detainer sections of the Utah Code Annotated, 
78-36-3 et sequal, talk in te rms of a Mtenant of real property . . . !f 
(emphasis added). Therefore, and necessarily, a landlord-tenant 
relationship has to exist before the unlawful detainer statutes are appli-
cable. This Court said as much in Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 
U. 192, 57 P . 882, when it said: 
1
 Action of unlawful detainer presupposes absence 
of fraud and force, as well as existence of relation 
of landlord and tenant. 
Also, any party claiming under the unlawful detainer statutes 
are held to a strict compliance. 
" Unlawful detainer statutes provide severe remedy 
and must be strictly complied with before cause 
d
 of action thereunder may be maintained. Van 
Zyverden v. F a r r a r , 15 Utah 2d 367, 393"P72d 
468 at page 470. 
And the cause of action has to ar ise at the time the action is commenced. 
Whether cause of action in unlawful detainer 
exists is to be determined at time action is 
commenced. Ibid at page 470. 
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It is clear from the record that Defendants-Respondents commenc 
their action for counterclaims and unlawful detainer on March 4, 1975. 
(R. page 19.) At this time, the Plaintiffs-Appellants were in the process 
of removing their furniture and were all out by about March 5, 1975. 
(Tr. page 180, line 28.) Accordingly, there could not have been any 
unlawful detainer at the time the action was commenced, as it was the 
Mid-Valley Investment's agent himself who was testifying above that the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants had removed their furniture and he found the key 
in the mailbox, "and it was about the 5th of March". Plaintiffs-Appellants 
testimony was that they had removed the last of February they thought. 
(Tr. page 198, line 4.) Accordingly, on this point alone, the claim 
for unlawful detainer must fail. If Mid-Valley found the key in the mail-
box about the 5th of March, it is an easy presumption for the t r ia l court 
to make that they were out on or before the 4th. There is no clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. 
Defendants-Respondents claim that such a relationship did 
exist between Mid-Valley Investment and the Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
However, the t r ia l court did not so find, and in its Conclusions of Law, 
Number 2, held: "That during the period in question, ownership and 
title were unresolved; the plaintiffs herein held possession, and at 
least constructive possession in an honest belief that they had ownership 
and were entitled to possession". (R. page 111.) Clearly then, the 
t r ia l court did not accept the argument of the Defendants-Respondents. 
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In this jurisdiction, it is clearly the law that the findings of 
the t r ial court will not be disturbed except in clearly justifiable cases . 
The following cases substantiate this: 
Supreme Court will not upset findings of t r ia l court 
unless evidence clearly preponderates to the con-
t ra ry . Utah 1975, Zions F i rs t National Bank v. F i r s t 
Security Bank of Utah, N .A. , 534 P . 2d 900. 
Even in equity cases, t r ia l court 's findings and 
judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
evidence clearly preponderates against them and 
a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought. (Per 
Crockett, J. , with one judge concurring and two 
judges concurring in result .) Utah 1974, McCullough 
v. Wasserback, 518 P. 2d 691, 30 Utah 2d~39lT 
Supreme Court will not disturb findings with respect 
to an equitable plea unless they are clearly against 
weight of evidence. Utah 1972, Achter v. Maw, 
493 P . 2d 989, 27 Utah 2d 149. 
Supreme Court may review facts in equity cases 
but makes allowance for advantaged position of 
t r ia l judge and does not disturb his findings and 
judgment merely because it might have viewed matter 
differently, unless evidence clearly preponderates 
against them or he has abused discretion or mis -
applied law. Utah 1970, Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P . 2d 
430, 24 Utah 2d 387. 
In equitable proceeding, Supreme Court may review 
findings but should not disturb them unless they are 
clearly against weight of evidence. Utah 1969, Chevron 
Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 449 P . 2d 989, 22 Utah 2d 
143. 
Supreme Court would sustain findings and determina-
tion made by t r ia l court in equity case unless evidence 
clearly preponderated against them or t r ia l court 
misapplied rules of law. Utah 1963, Weggleland v. 
Ujifusa, 384 P. 2d 590, 14 Utah 2d 364. 
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It is also the rule of law in this jurisdiction that the findings 
of the t r ia l court are presumed correct, and the burden of proving 
e r ro r falls upon the party alleging it. 
In reviewing proceeding in equity seeking determina-
tion as to which of two mortgages takes precedence, 
deference is given to prerogative of t r ial court to 
make findings and judgment, and t r ia l court is in-
dulged with same presumptions of verity accorded 
in other equitable proceedings. Utah 1970, Kemp 
v. Zions Fi rs t Nat. Bank, 470 P . 2d 390, 24 Utah 
2d 288. 
Although action to avoid deeds is one in equity upon 
which reviewing court has both the prerogative and 
the duty to review and weigh the evidence, and to 
determine the facts, t r ia l court 's findings and 
judgment are presumed correct, and appellant has 
burden to show they were in e r ror ; and where the 
evidence is in conflict, reviewing court will not 
upset t r ial court 's findings merely because review-
ing court may have viewed the matter differently, 
but will do so only if evidence clearly preponderates 
against the t r ia l court 's findings and judgment. 
Utah 1972, Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P . 2d 811, 
27 Utah 2d 286. 
Therefore, it would appear from the foregoing that unless 
the lower court clearly made a serious and blatant e r ro r in its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, completely unsubstantiated by the 
evidence or law of the case — this Court must uphold the decision of 
the t r ial court. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully submit that the evidence 
does substantiate the findings and decision of the t r ia l court and an 
examination of it will so prove. 
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The Defendants-Respondents make much of exhibit 1-d, pur-
porting to be the agreement which created the landlord-tenant relationship, 
and thus paved the way for the unlawful detainer claim. It should be 
noted that Defendants-Respondents have abandoned their claim to un-
lawful detainer on the home on 12th Avenue, and limit their claim to 
the apartment house on 11th East. 
The language of exhibit 1-d, pertinant to the 11th East property 
and upon which Defendants-Respondents rely to establish this crucial 
landlord-tenant relationship, is as follows: 
Andersons will remain in possession of apartment 
(246 - 11th East) unti l january 31, 1975 at midnight 
— or before at option of Andersons. No rent to 
be charged. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully urge that there is nothing in 
the language above which creates a landlord-tenant relationship for the 
letting of property. Nowhere do the te rms "landlord" or "tenant" appear. 
Nowhere does there appear any rental figure. In fact, it simply cannot 
be called a rental agreement at all . Also, according to the testimony 
before the t r ia l court, there was no prior discussion about the terms 
"landlord" and "tenant" for the transcript (Tr. page 192, lines 6-22) 
discloses the following: 
Q (Mr. Dodd): And was there any discussion had 
prior to the signing of that agreement concerning 
the term "landlord"? 
A (Mr. Anderson): No, sir ; not as such, no. 
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Q (Mr. Dodd): I see. When you signed that 
agreement does the agreement contain the term 
' landlord"? 
Mr. Mabey: Objection, your Honor. The agree-
ment speaks for itself again. 
The Court: It does. I have got it right in front 
of me. 
Mr. Dodd: O.K., very good. 
Q (Mr. Dodd): Mr. Anderson, in the discussion 
that took place prior to the signing of that document 
was there any discussion with regard to the term 
"tenants"? 
A (Mr. Anderson): No. That word did not come up 
at all . 
Q (Mr. Dodd): And at the time you signed that 
document did you understand by signing it you would 
become a tenant? 
A (Mr. Anderson): No, sir ; not as such. 
And with regard to what the document really was, the following 
testimony was before the t r ia l court: 
A (Mr. Anderson): This agreement was signed to 
buy us time to get out and find a place for my family 
to live. It was our feeling, and we were given to under-
stand, if we had not signed this we could have been put 
out on the street that evening. So in order to still have 
my family, my wife and two children, and this was buy-
ing time to arrange for an orderly time to find a suitable 
place to live and make these arrangements. (At Tr. 193, 
lines 15-21.) 
Pr ior to the foregoing testimony, Mr. Anderson had testified: 
"We had always taken the stand that the original sale was improper and 
- 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i l legal and that because of that we were the t rue legal owners of the 
property1 1 . (See T r . page 193, line 1.) F u r t h e r , M r s . Anderson 
test if ied that her tes t imony would be the same if asked the identical 
ques t ions . (See T r . page 196, l ines 9-12.) 
F r o m the foregoing, it is c l e a r that at least the Andersons 
never looked upon the document a s a ren ta l ag reement , and if the t r i a l 
court chose to believe them, then the re was ample evidence for the 
court to find that it was not a ren ta l ag reement , and did not c r ea t e a 
landlord- tenant re la t ionship with r ega rd to the p roper ty on 11th E a s t . 
And the re being no overwhelming evidence to the con t ra ry , th is Court , 
according to its own decis ions enumera ted above, must affirm the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings. 
In o rde r for the Defendants-Respondents to preva i l , they 
would have to es tabl i sh that t he re was c l e a r and convincing evidence 
that the r equ i r emen t s of Section 78-36-3(1) had been met , i . e . 
1) That a landlord- tenant re la t ionship was es tab l i shed . 
2) That rent for a fixed t e r m was es tab l i shed . 
3) That the p roper ty was " le t" to the Ande r sons . 
4) That exhibit 1-d was a ren ta l ag reemen t . 
This the Defendants-Respondents have failed to do and therefore 
they cannot p reva i l . 
In addition to the foregoing, and even if th is Court could, by 
some wild s t r e t ch of i ts imagination, ca l l exhibit 1-d a ren ta l ag reement , 
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and if this Court found by some equally wild s t r e t ch of i ts imagination 
that a landlord-tenant re la t ionship existed — the Defendants-Respondents 
s t i l l could not p reva i l . 
Section 78-36-3(1) of the Utah Code Annotated, upon which 
Defendants-Respondents re ly , specifically s t a t e s : "When he (the tenant) 
continues in possess ion , in pe rson or by subtenant . . . " In the case at 
bar , t he re i s no tes t imony that Plaint iffs-Appellants remained in 
possess ion beyond the date of January 31, 1975, which was the date 
allegedly agreed upon in the purported ag reement . The tes t imony before 
the t r i a l court was: (See T r . page 196, l ines 22-27.) 
Q (Mr. Dodd): Let me r e p h r a s e i t . When did you 
last have physical possess ion that p r o p e r t y ? (11th 
East) 
A (Mrs . Anderson): On the last day of January . 
Q (Mr. Dodd): And were you permi t ted to go 
into that p roper ty after t ha t ? 
A (Mrs . Anderson): Never . 
And under c ross -examina t ion : (See T r . page 199, l ines 2-12.) 
A (Mrs . Anderson): No. The only way they 
would make the apar tment available to me if I 
had a client come in, M r . Broadbent would 
open up the door and I would conduct bus iness , 
and he did. I never did have a c c e s s to that place 
after the last of J anua ry . 
Q. (Mr. Mabey): Isn ! t it t r u e , M r s . Anderson, 
that at the t ime you finally decided to remove your 
belongings M r . Broadbent allowed you to remove 
them subject to your own prudence and your own 
convenience ? 
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n A (Mrs . Anderson): No, that i sn ' t t r u e . He un- • • 
locked that but only gave me a key if I would take 
o<?- ; out so many things , but he would never give me 
a key so I would have a c c e s s . 
Even Mid-Val ley ' s own agent test if ied to the t r i a l court that 
"In behalf of Mid-Valley, I called a locksmith and had those locks 
changed on a l l of the units11. (11th Eas t proper ty) (Tr . page 179, l ines 
20-21.) And under c ross -examina t ion , Mid-Val ley ' s agent test if ied 
(T r . page 183-184, l ines 17-30 and 1-11.) a s follows: 
Q . Isn ' t it t r ue that the Andersons never rea l ly 
JLJ-" did have physical possess ion of the p roper ty on 
11th Avenue? 
A. They were not living t h e r e . 
Q . Were they? ;•:.-•» r 
A. They were not living t h e r e . 
Q . I s e e . And even af ter January 31st, they 
never did have physical possess ion in that s ense , 
did they? 
M r . Mabey: Objection, your Honor, to ask 
the wi tness to make a legal de terminat ion as far 
( a s possess ion is concerned . ' 
The Court : All he asked him was physical . 
M r . Mabey: There is no legal quest ion to d e t e r -
mine, so I won't - - I have no objection. 
The Court : He means were they living t he r e 
M r . Dodd: I think M r . Mabey is empowering 
me with some abil i ty far g r e a t e r than I rea l ly have. 
The Court : You will both have to ta lk a little 
louder . 
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Q (Mr. Dodd): All I am asking is did the Andersons 
have physical possession of the property on 11th East? 
A. They were not living there. They had their 
things stored there and removed them. 
Q. O.K. Now, what was the date you changed the 
loc ks on the door ? 
A. February 1st. 
Hence, it was clear to the t r ia l court that the Plaintiffs -
Appellants never physically possessed the property on 11th East after 
January 31, 1975, and that Defendants-Respondents actually changed 
the locks on February 1, 1975, effectively denying them free possession 
of the premises. Therefore, the claim of Defendants-Respondents must 
rest upon the fact that some of Plaintiffs-Appellants1 property was left 
in the premises . In this claim they cannot prevail as the section of the 
statute upon which they rely specifically states lfa tenant . . . when he 
continues in possession, in person or by subtenant . . . f! is guilty of 
an unlawful detainer. (78-36-3(1) Utah Code Annotated.) Thus, in order 
for Defendants-Respondents to prevail on their theory, the belongings 
left on the,premises would have to be called "persons", "tenants" or 
"subtenants". 
The next argument the Defendants-Respondents raise concerns 
the findings of the tr ial court that their notice "was defective", is 
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erroneous. (Defendants-Respondents1 Brief, page 38.) Of course, if 
this Court finds that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, then this 
question would not have to be treated; however, it must be kept in 
mind that the t r ia l court had before it not only the unlawful detainer 
claim on the property at 11th East, but also a similar claim on the 
home on 12th Avenue. The only evidence before the t r ia l court was 
exhibit 2-d, purportedly a "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate". 
However, this was served upon Mrs . Anderson only (Tr. page 177, line 
13), and by its own terms refers strictly to the 12th Avenue property. 
Clearly, under this Court 's holding in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 
243 P. 2d 446, that: 
An action for unlawful detainer cannot be main-
tained against a tenant to whom no copy of the 
notice required by the statute was mailed, although 
a copy was left with his wife. 
That the t r ia l court was absolutely correct in holding that the 
service was inadequate, was and is beyond dispute. With regard to the 
11th East property, the evidence before the t r ia l court was that Defendants-
Respondents extended the occupancy of the Plaintiffs-Appellants voluntarily, 
for under cross-examination, the following was given: 
Q (Mr. Dodd): Mr. Broadbent, you have testified 
that Mr. Anderson phoned you on or about the 31st 
of January requesting an extension of t ime, but 
you never did say whether you granted the extension, 
Did you in fact grant an extension of time ? 
A. Yes, I did. 
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Q. Until when, the 10th of February? 
A. No. He asked me, he said it would take him 
about one week and I said that would be fine, would 
he have it out then, and he said, "Yes, I am sure 
we will be out by then". This was on the 31st. (Tr. 
page 183, lines 7-16.) 
A further extension was then voluntarily given until Defendants-
Respondents could be served with a restraining order to which they 
agreed. (Tr. page 180, lines 1-10.) 
By the 10th of February, the Defendants-Respondents had 
been restrained by the Third District Court (R. page 11) from removing 
Plaintiffs-Appellants1 property from the premises, and from denying 
them reasonable use of the office. The hearing on the restraining order 
was had on the 18th of February, 1975, and made permanent the order 
provided that Plaintiffs-Appellants posted a $7,500.00 bond. (R. page 13-
14.) Rather than post the bond, Plaintiffs-Appellants removed their 
property approximately two weeks later. (Tr. page 180, lines 22-28.) 
Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully point out that until 
February 10, they had the express permission of the Mid-Valley Invest-
ment Company to remain on the premises . Thereafter, it was under 
judicial restraint until Plaintiffs-Appellants removed their property in 
the first week of March. There is no evidence that between February 18 
and March 5, the Defendants-Respondents took any action to have the 
bond filed or otherwise. Thus, Plaintiffs-Appellants have not in any 
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respect unlawfully restrained Mid-Valley Investment from use of the 
premises . This is especially true where the record shows that this 
property had five apartments in it (Tr. page 185, lines 10-11), and the 
only area claimed to have the furniture of Plaintiffs-Appellants in it 
was a 91 x l l f office (Tr. page 197, lines 10-18), and a breakfast 
room adjacent. (Tr. page 200, lines 1-8.) This represents a very 
small portion of the five-plex apartment house. 
It should also be pointed out that the order of the t r ia l court 
which heard the argument on the question of the restraining order, never 
fixed a date by which the bond should be submitted. This order was p re -
pared by Defendants-Respondents1 attorney. (R. pages 13-14.) It has 
never been reversed or superseded by a subsequent order of any court, 
and Defendants-Respondents have never requested a determination of the 
same. They simply let the matter slide and took no affirmative action. 
On page 40 of their Brief, the Defendants-Respondents asser t , 
under Section C, that the amended Conclusions of Law, Numbers 1 and 2, 
are erroneous. To support this claim, they cite Fo r re s t e r v. Cook, 77 
Utah 137, 292 P . 206 (1930) and Tanner v. Lowler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P . 2d 
882, rehearing granted, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P . 2d 791 (1957). Both of these 
cases are readily distinguishable and not applicable to the case at bar. 
In Cook, supra, there was a definite buy-sell agreement between the parties 
which amounted to a real estate contract. Plaintiff sued for return of the 
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premises on breach of the contract payment schedule. Defendant 
was in possession. In our case, there was no real estate contract, 
no payment schedule and certainly nobody in possession. In Tanner, 
supra, the facts are nowhere near analogous to the case at bar. The 
issue in the case was one concerning whether or not the plaintiff had 
a right to redeem, and whether he had, in fact, redeemed by giving 
the defendant Reichert $9,078.81. Reichert for his part, was an 
intervener in the case and had obtained an assignment of the Sheriff1 s 
Certificate of Sale from the foreclosing mortgagee. At the time he took 
the assignment, he knew that plaintiff wanted to redeem, but the Court 
held that because Reichert, knowing Tanner wanted to redeem, still 
only took an assignment of the Sheriff1 s Certificate of Sale, he was bound 
by his decision and Tanner's redemption was valid. This was the 
principal issue of the case; however, the Court had to deal with the 
problem of unlawful detainer, as the Lowlers, as Reichert1 s tenants, had 
been in possession of the premises and refused to move. Unfortunately, 
the Lowlers were poor and judgment-proof as this Court indicated at 
page 887 of 305 P . 2d 882: 
Here it is evident that the money judgment against 
the Lowlers is not collectable. 
Thus, because the tenants in possession were judgment-proof, 
the Court passed along the judgment to Reichert who was, in fact, the 
antagonist. The reasoning of the Court was as follows: 
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*• This p r e sen t s the problem of whether a pe r son , u ; -<; 
not actually occupying the p r e m i s e s and who 
'- does not c la im as tenant of the pe r son bringing </ 
the action, in tervenes in the action and a s s e r t s 
! !
 ownership of the p roper ty and both he and the
 f ^ >-i -, 
ac tual occupant a s s e r t the right of posses s ion 
in the actual occupant only as such i n t e r v e n e r s ; iir v r> 
tenant, is guilty of unlawful de ta iner of the p r o -
!i
'' per ty where the court in such act ion finally ' j r : v 
decides that the i n t e r v e n e r ' s c la im to such 
p roper ty is invalid. (Page 886) , M j 
» > •:•:;• It should a lso be noted that in making i ts ruling, th is Court 
l imited i ts rul ing to ! ,in th is kind of c a s e " (emphasis added) (See . 
Defendants-Respondents 1 Brief, page 41.) F r o m the case itself, we can 
**' observe that what l !in th is kind of c a s e " means is a s follows: 
M
 1) Where t he r e is a tenant in possess ion . r 
.:•> • :rv <--' 2) Where tenant refuses to move after notice. A>,r 
' 3) Where t he re is an in te rvener who bo l s t e r s the posit ion 
of the tenant and through whom the tenant c l a ims the right to possess ion . 
r
 i -j- Obviously, none of the above m e a s u r e s apply in the case at bar 
where t he re was no tenant in possess ion , no refusal to move out, and where 
p r e m i s e s involved only two rooms of a five-plex apar tment house . Also, 
Plaint iffs-Appellants were denied the right to move the i r furni ture by 
Mid-Valley changing the locks . H 
I tems "DM and , !E f ! of the Defendants-Respondents1 Brief, at page 
42, a r e only applicable in c a s e s of unlawful de ta iner . The Court need 
not get to these quest ions of " F a i r Rental '1 value and "Damages" a s t he re 
was no unlawful deta iner and the r equ i r emen t s of Section 78-36-3(1) have 
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not been met. However, since Defendants-Respondents have raised these 
issues, they must be addressed. A -
The testimony before the t r ia l court was that there was no 
renter for the premises on February 1, 1975 (Tr. page 186, lines 4-9), 
and that the first bona-fide offer to rent was on the 15th of March. (Tr. 
page 186, lines 10-13.) There was obviously no rental payment under 
the terms of exhibit 1-d (the purported rental agreement). Hence, there 
is no accurate figure to base the rental value on for the time period 
covered by the alleged unlawful detainer. The Mid-Valley Investment 
Company agent did say he rented the premises later for $310.00 per 
month. (Tr. page 181, lines 17-18.) But there is nothing to indicate 
what it was that was rented for $310.00 per month. There is no descrip-
tion of the rented premises . Plaintiffs-Appellants testified that their 
property was in a small 9f x l l f office and adjoining kichenette. Is the 
Court to believe that this is what was rented for $310. 00 per month? 
Or should it be some prorated share of the same? Inasmuch as there 
is no clear and convincing evidence as to the real, fair rental value of 
the property, and no adequate description of the premises rented, the 
Defendants-Respondents have failed to carry their burden on this point. 
On the question of damages, the Defendants-Respondents are 
obviously asking for too much. Even if we allow the exhibit 1-d, there 
is still the clear testimony of Mr. Broadbent that he willingly allowed an 
extension of the same until ttie 10th of February, 1975. (Tr. 178, line 28; 
- 19 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T r . page 180, l ines 1-9) The proper ty was under judicial r e s t r a in t by 
the 10th of F e b r u a r y . (JR. page 11; T r . page 180, l ines 12-13.) The 
judicial r e s t r a in t was affirmed on the 18th of F e b r u a r y , 1975. (R. page 
13.) The judicial r e s t r a in t has never been lifted; however, the Plaint i f fs-
Appellants removed t he i r p roper ty in the first week in March . At 
any t ime , up and until the r emova l of t he i r p roper ty , Plaint iffs-Appellants 
could have posted the requi red bond to bind the Defendants-Respondents 
from removing t he i r p roper ty until t r i a l , but they elected not t o . Also , 
t he re was no affirmative act ion of the Defendants-Respondents to get 
the bond posted or to remove the p rope r ty . • n ,, , 
^rti o f nf C lea r ly then, the Defendants-Respondents , of t he i r own volition, 
extended the t ime until they were se rved with the judicial r e s t r a i n t . 
Thereaf te r , they never took any act ion until Plaintiffs -Appellants r e -
moved the p roper ty . Can th is be said to be the kind of unlawful 
posses s ion requi red to come within the perview of 78-36-3(1)? Also , 
even if it was , the days freely allowed by Defendants-Respondents 
could not be included, nor can the days of the judicial r e s t r a in t , which 
was never lifted. Therefore , the Defendants-Respondents can take nothing. 
POINT II 
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NO. 7 IS NOT ERRONEOUS AND 
THE ANDERSONS SHOULD NOT FORFEIT THEIR $300.00 BOND, NOR 
ARE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. 
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F i r s t l y , the res t ra in ing o rde r of F e b r u a r y 10, 1975 did not 
enjoin the Defendants-Respondents from "occupying the 11th East 
c o m m e r c i a l p roper ty" as alleged at page 43 of Defendants-Respondents1 
Brief. The document itself c lea r ly s ta tes only that the Defendants -
Respondents could not: 
A) Remove any of the Plaintiffs-Appellants1 p roper ty , 
B) Deny the Plaint iffs-Appellants use of the office in the 
p r e m i s e s . 
The r ema inde r of the proper ty was in no way covered by the 
o r d e r . . J " •<•?•.- .->*• - . ;"•* • ' « v f : ^ •• 
Secondly, the s ta tement on the same page that "this o rde r 
remained in effect until F e b r u a r y 18, 1975" is a conclusion and not a 
s ta tement of fact. The o rde r of F e b r u a r y 18, 1975 reaff i rms the o rde r 
of F e b r u a r y 10, 1975 and simply adds the condition that Plaint i f fs-
Appellants had to put up a $7, 500. 00 bond. This they obtained (Tr . 
page 198, l ines 17-20.) , but elected to remove the i r p roper ty instead. 
However, both o r d e r s of the court were legal and p roper and binding 
upon the Defendants-Respondents . It should be noted that although the 
o r d e r s of the court were issued, the Defendants-Respondents never 
complied with them. Plaint iffs-Appellants were never given the use 
of the office in the building (Tr . page 196, l ines 20-27) unless they 
phoned first and then M r . Broadbent was present while Plaintiffs-Appellants 
used the office (Tr . page 199, l ines 2-6). This cannot be construed 
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as complying with the order of the court. Plaintiffs-Appellants 
respectfully urge that one cannot complain of a court order that one 
never complied with. 
With respect to Rule 65A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and the claim that Mid-Valley Investment Company is entitled to bond 
forfeiture under the same (Defendants-Respondents1 Brief, page 43), 
there is no credulity. It was not until April 10, 1975 that the issue of 
Defendants-Respondents1 Summary Judgment was finally determined. 
Up and until that time, the legitimacy of the alleged trustee fs sale was 
in doubt. Hence, at the time the temporary restraining order of 
February 10th was obtained, the ownership of the property was in question. 
Also, it must be remembered that at this time, Defendants-Respondents 
had changed the locks on the doors and had refused Plaintiffs-Appellants 
use of the office on the freedom to remove their furniture at will. Thus, 
the question is, where the ownership of the property is in dispute and 
controlled by one party not formerly the owner, is it wrong for the 
District Court to issue a temporary restraining order allowing temporary 
use of the premises to the former owner? 
The language of Rule 65A(c) talks of the restraint being "wrong-
fully" ordered. That is, the issuing court had no authority to grant it 
in the first place. The Coggins case cited in Defendants-Respondents1 
Brief at page 44 is exactly on point. The Coggins v. Wright, 22 Arizona 
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App. 217, 526 P . 2d 741, case dealt with the following fact situation: 
On June 15, 1949, appellant obtained a -* ^ 
judgment against appellees in the Maricopa 
County Superior Court. On June 7, 1954, 
appellant filed an affidavit of renewal on said 
judgment pursuant to A. R. S. Section 12-1612. 
Thereafter, appellant filed additional affidavits of 
renewal of the said judgment on May 26, 1959, April 
23, 1964 and May 12, 1969. 
In September of 1969 appellant secured a 
general writ of execution to issue on said judg-
ment and, over one year later, on December 
4, 1970, delivered it to the Maricopa County 
Sheriff with instructions to levy first against 
personal property. 
On December 9, 1970, the Sheriff seized 
appellees1 1965 Chevrolet automobile. Appellees1 
attorney advised the Sheriff that the writ was 
invalid. The Sheriff disagreed and proceeded 
with the sale which took place on December 30, 
1970, at which time the automobile was sold 
for $200.00. 
Pr ior to the sale appellant offered to release 
the vehicle from the execution if the appellees 
would waive their rights to sue for unlawful 
execution. Appellees refused this offer. 
Before the sale by the Sheriff appellees 
filed a motion in superior court to quash the 
writ of execution but took no steps to stay the 
sale. On January 22, 1971, the writ of execu- ' 
tion was quashed by the court. Appellant filed 
an appeal from the order quashing the writ but 
later abandoned the appeal. 
Appellees then brought this action for 
wrongful execution against the appellant and the 
Sheriff. (At page 742) (emphasis added) 
The court then went on to hold that: 
Appellees maintain that the court 's order quashing 
the writ of execution was conclusive on the wrong-
fulness and we agree, (at page 742) 
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: ^ Therefore, in the Coggins case, supra, upon which Defendants -
Respondents rely, the issuing court itself quashed the writ as being 
wrongfully issued. In the case at bar there is no such quash nor any 
motion to do such by the Defendants-Respondents. Indeed, after a full 
hearing, the order was affirmed; therefore, how could it have been 
wrongfully issued? The record is clear that the same court some two 
months later granted Defendants-Respondents1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment; however, at the time of issuance, there was nothing wrongful 
about the order and the issuing court acted fully within its power. At 
the t r ia l of this issue, the t r ia l court refused to declare that the order 
was issued wrongfully, and the Defendants-Respondents have not presented 
any evidence to demonstrate obvious e r ror ; therefore, the finding of the 
t r ia l court is conclusive of the matter. (See R. page 112, Conclusion 
No. 7.) 
As pointed out above, Rule 65A(c) contains no language concerning 
forfeiture. Therefore, what the Defendants-Respondents are asking 
cannot be allowed. However, if this Court did find that the restraining 
order was wrongfully issued, then the rule does allow ,!for the payment 
of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party 
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained". (65A(c) 
This language expressly states that the "costs" and "damages" have to 
be "incurred" or "suffered". At the t r ia l , there was no evidence 
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presented with regards to "costs" or "damages" "incurred" or "suffered". 
Having presented none, the Defendants-Respondents have waived their 
right to the same. The affidavit of Attorney Ralph Mabey (R. page 44) 
cannot constitute evidence in this case. If Rule 65A(c) is to be applied 
at all, it must be for the benefit of the injured party, not the attorney 
for the injured party. While Mr. Mabey1 s affidavit no doubt constitutes 
an accounting of his t ime, it is not evidence. There was no evidence 
that it was presented for payment, or that it has been paid, i . e . , that 
Mid-Valley has been damaged that much. Therefore, Defendants-
Respondents cannot recover for lack of proof of their damages and costs 
sustained, if any. 
In addition, in the Coggins case, supra, upon which the 
Defendants-Respondents rely, the attorney's fees were awarded for the 
time used by the attorney to get the writ quashed. In the case at bar, 
it was never quashed, neither at the hearing on the 18th of February nor 
at the t r ial on April 10th, nor was any motion to quash raised by 
Defendants-Respondents. As in the Coggins case, supra, Plaintiffs-
Appellants respectfully maintain that the fact it was not quashed is con-
clusive of its proper and rightful issuance. ; ., .-,.- . 
The law on damages is quite clear: ^ * i i - ' .<
 4 > -^  
Generally speaking, the party who would lose if 
no evidence were presented as to an issue regard-
ing damages is charged with the burden of proving 
that issue. As a rule, the burden of proof is upon 
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the plaintiff to show the fact and extent of the 
injury and to show the amount and value of his 
damages, whether the action is for a breach of 
contract or for tort . In a damages action, 
where issue is taken the plaintiff must show not 
only that he has suffered damage because of the 
wrongful act complained of, but also that it would 
not have been incurred except for the wrongful 
act of the defendant, if he would recover more 
than nominal damages. 22 Am. Jur . 2d Damages 
; Section 296 page 392. _ ^ . :
 v 
The record of the t r ial court is devoid of any evidence on 
this question of damages, and especially the claim for attorney's fees. 
Mr. Mabey's affidavit was not tendered at the t r ial , nor did he or his 
client present any oral testimony. This affidavit was an exhibit attached 
to his Memorandum of Law supporting its Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Bond Forfeiture (R. page 44). However, the lower court refused 
to hear the matter upon motion and reserved it for the time of t r ia l . 
(R. page 108.) Thus, at the t r ia l the affidavit should have been presented 
and/or accompanied by oral testimony. In this manner, it could have 
been cross-examined; however, under the conditions of this case, it 
would be inadmissible as hearsay. Also, Plaintiffs-Appellants have 
had no chance for cross examination of the same. It is submitted that 
under the general law outlined below, the Defendants-Respondents have 
waived their right to damages by not presenting any at the time of t r ia l : 
The admissibility of evidence to establish or dis-
prove the elements and amount of damage or the 
measure of recovery is governed by the rules and 
principles governing the admissibility of evidence 
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in civil ac t ions . 22 Am. J u r . 2d Section 303 page 
402. 
- • > ,n -\..' i n • • . . . 
It i s submitted that the affidavit is inadmiss ible under the law 
the way it has been presen ted in th is c a s e . 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion then, the c la im by Mid-Valley Investment for 
unlawful deta iner with accompanying damages must fail for the follow-
ing r easons : 
A) There has been no landlord- tenant re la t ionship es tabl ished. 
B) The t e r m s of the statute 78-36-3(1) have not been s t r ic t ly 
met. 
C) There was no unlawful deta iner because Plaint iffs-Appellants 
were never in possess ion . 7 
;
 D) At the t ime the counterc la im for unlawful deta iner was 
filed, the Plaint iffs-Appellants had e i ther moved out or were in the 
p r o c e s s of so doing. 
;•--%; E) The Defendants-Respondents agreed and permi t ted Plaint i f fs-
Appellants to leave the i r furni ture on the p r e m i s e s . 
The c la im for forfeiture of the $300.00 bond must fail because : 
A) Rule 65A (c) does not apply to the case at ba r . 
B) The re s t r a in ing o rde r was p roper ly and rightly issued and 
has never been resc inded or quashed. 
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C) The Defendants-Respondents have not presented any 
evidence with regard to damages and costs incurred and, therefore, 
forfeited the same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRAHAM DODD 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
;
 ( . , _ , t;i ,. , ; CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of November, 1975, 
I served two copies each of the foregoing Brief by delivering same 
to Ralph R. Mabey, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Mid-Valley 
Investment, 225 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and Robert D. 
Merrill, Attorney for Defendants-Respondents Capital Thrift and Loan 
Company and James B. Mason, as Trustee, 141 East First South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, ^ ^ ^ ^ /? 
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